A Proposal to Revise Harvard University’s Strategic Triangle
Administrative Note:
The Strategic Triangle is a concept developed by Dr. Mark Moore and used in the Harvard University’s JFK School of Government curriculum.
I am grateful for Dr. Mark Moore’s work. Without it, my understanding of public policy would not be as complete.
Although the Strategic Triangle is applicable to all areas of Public Policy, this article focuses on issues in developing countries.
I. Introduction.
During my service in the US Army Psychological Operations Command and the Special Forces Regiment, I participated in bilateral programs to enhance the internal security of partner nations. Although my work was focused on enhancing security and readiness, the outcomes indirectly helped protect market-oriented policies that ensured the positive momentum of regional and global trade.
Our endeavors required a close working relationship with allied military leaders, local political officials, public administrators, and non-governmental organizations. During those interactions, I realized that most functionaries first defined public value from their own points of view.
Organizations and individuals define public value from their own perspectives.
II. Whose problem is it?
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, as a member of a small US SOF Terrorist Coordination Assistance Visit (TCAV) contingent, I helped assess the national, regional, and community-level policies of the Philippine military’s fight against the Abu Sayyaf Group.
The weeks long assessment involved a thorough analysis of the national strategy, provincial level observations, and a detailed scrutiny of on-the-ground tactical implementation.
During one of the many back-to-back briefings held at the Philippine military’s General Headquarters in the capital city of Manila, I noticed a very peculiar event about how seemingly minor misinterpretations of national-level strategy can result in confusion and delays during implementation at lower levels.
One of the services defined the Abu Sayyaf as a “military problem.”
During the very next briefing — conducted by a sister service — the same issue was presented as a “police problem.”
When we shifted the assessment from Manila to the province of Zamboanga, and later to the island of Basilan, there was palpable disagreement amongst military commanders about how to best interdict the Abu Sayyaf Group.
III. Whose power generator is it?
“The military commander took our generator and is using it at his camp.” — Female Elementary School Principal, Island of Basilan, Philippines
One of the key elements of civil affairs operations is to strengthen “support to governance, provide essential services, support economic development and infrastructure, and establish civil control for civilian populations” (“CIMIC Handbook,” n.d.).
After we established the Special Operations footprint in 2002, US and Philippine Civil Affairs Teams began rebuilding the political, economic, and social infrastructure on Basilan Island. A crucial equipment of the aid package included portable power generators for the dedicated use of local schools that would bridge the gap until the Philippine government could implement a more permanent power generation solution.
Two years later, in 2004, during a site visit on Basilan, we inspected the condition of a portable power generator that had been donated to a local elementary school.
We could not find the generator on school grounds. We later found out that the generator had been moved to a nearby military camp. When asked why the military commander borrowed the generator, the principal said that military missions took precedence.
We made it explicitly clear to the military commander that the generator was not for his use.
We suggested that he return the power generator to its rightful owner — and watched his men carry it back to the school. We left on a good note — and advised him that, if he still needed a generator, he could request one through Philippine military channels.
IV. Traditional framework.
The Strategic Triangle has been used by Public Administrators as a framework to achieve “public value”, or to evaluate the efficacy of public programs.
This is the traditional Strategic Triangle.
“Public Value” is at the apex.
According to the original framework, when the voters (or political will, or the authorizing environment) align with the capacities (administrative talent, availability of resources, or operating capacity) of a community, public value is achieved.
However, in my experience I found that the definition of “public value” is malleable, negotiable, intangible, and esoteric.
Furthermore, the subjective interpretations of “public value” and rationale for achieving value can be dictated by a power imbalance, or by the skewed influence of either the Authorizing Body (political will), or the Operational Capacity (administrative ambitions).
If one of the two corners exerts too much pressure, or pulls too much, the remaining corners could collapse — which will destroy the integrity of the structure — and crush the definition of “public value.”
Any movement of one or two corners towards the center — destroys the foundational strength of the triangle — and its continued ability to function as designed.
V. Questions that are not answered by the existing framework.
- What is the “public value” upon completion of the project?
- What is the “public value” when the project has unforseen effects on other community goals?
- Is there continued “public value” when the project requires maintenance, or re-design?
- What is the “public value” if the project needs to be replaced, improved, or destroyed?
VI. Utility of triangles in construction projects.
This is how a triangle-shaped design supports tension and compression in engineering projects.
In Public Policy, these competing forces equate to political positioning, issue framing, economic throttles, social opposition, and cultural pressures.
VII. A different view.
Communities work together to achieve a material goal (roads, dams, buildings, parks, etc.), and not for an esoteric or subjective concept such as “public value.”
And even if public value is the goal, the definition of that “value” is always tied to a project, or to a program.
My proposal.
I propose that “public value” be moved from the apex to the middle of the Strategic Triangle, and in its place at the apex, insert the Project/Program.
By re-positioning “public value” to the center of the triangle, and replacing the apex with the Project/Program, we begin public project discussions, resource allocations, and negotiations with three (3) distinct, recognizable, and tangible corners.
With this updated arrangement, each corner has the freedom to individually define “public value” from their organizational/individual perspectives.
Left Corner:
The Authorizing Environment view public value based on their organizational charter.
Right Corner:
Administrators view their public value in the efficient manner in which they manage resources against competing requirements.
Apex:
The project/program becomes the material, tangible, and visible goal.
With this update, each of the 3 Tangible Corners uses their inherent powers to push against the wishes of the other two entities to maintain recognizability, credibility, and utility.
The perpetual tug-of-war amongst all three corners is what creates “public value.”
With “public value” in the middle — all three corners now have the freedom to categorize value on their own terms — and grasp, articulate, and write their own definition(s) of success.
VIII. Conclusion.
I am grateful for the rare opportunities to witness how communities in crisis deal with a lack of resources. Despite elongated periods of stress, communities find cohesive ways to achieve a common goal.
I have come to realize that under duress, survival instincts and the “scarcity mindset” can take over which skews the methodical approach of logical decision-making.
That military commander probably reasoned that power-on-demand at his camp had more value than the community’s academic aspirations.
In hindsight, the military unit and the school principal could have made a temporary sharing agreement during periods when school was not in session, or negotiated the re-prioritization of the use of the power generator during periods of crisis.
An uncomplicated, local-level sharing agreement could have paved the way for the Authorizing Environment (USAID and Bilateral Civil Affairs Reconstruction Team), the Operational Capacity (shared by the Local School and the Local Military Camp), and the Project (Portable Power Generator) to create a permanent, palpable, and personalized description of “public value.”
Published March 17, 2022. Edited September 2022 and February 18, 2023.
Copyright Leonard Casiple 2022, 2023. All rights reserved.
About the author: Leo Casiple is a first-generation American who grew up in Southern Philippines under martial law. He spent much of his 21-year career in the US Army as a Green Beret.
Leo is currently a doctoral student at Northeastern University’s Doctor of Law and Policy program (2022–2025 Cohort). He earned his education from California Lutheran University (MPPA), ASU Thunderbird School of Global Management (MBA in Global Management), Excelsior University (BS in Liberal Arts, Ethnic and Area Studies), Academy of Competitive Intelligence (Master of Competitive Intelligence™), Defense Language Institute and Foreign Language Center (18-month Arabic Language Course), and the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (Special Forces Qualification Course and Psychological Operations Specialist Course).
For more information about the author, click here: Leo’s LinkedIn Profile
References
CIMIC Handbook. (n.d.). CCOE, CIMIC-handbook. https://www.handbook.cimic-coe.org
Moore, M. H. (1995). Creating public value: Strategic management in government. Harvard University Press.
Why is a triangle a strong shape? (n.d.). Let’s Talk Science. https://letstalkscience.ca/educational-resources/backgrounders/why-a-triangle-a-strong-shape
