Creative Peacemaking in Mindanao
Based on shocking memories of my upbringing under martial law, return to Mindanao as a US Army Green Beret to help improve security, and a better grasp of the elusive abstractness of political, economic, social, and cultural descriptions of public value.
by Leonard B. Casiple
Leo Casiple is a first-generation American who spent much of his 21-year career in the US Army as a Green Beret. His experience includes linguistics, training, area and cultural studies, operations, logistics, and community outreach. Leo earned his education from California Lutheran University (MPPA), ASU Thunderbird School of Global Management (MBA), Excelsior College (BS), Defense Language Institute and Foreign Language Center (Arabic), and the US Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School. He is involved in the community as the brainchild of the Filipino American Special Forces Society, Lions Club Veteran of the Year Selection Committee, local Toastmasters club, and recently helped paint over graffiti with the Chula Vista Chamber of Commerce.
For more information about the author, click here: Leo’s LinkedIn Profile
Note:
This work was originally submitted to the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue’s 2021 Peacewriter Prize Competition in Brussels.
Upon submission, I relinquished the copyright to the Centre; however, I have been given express written consent to publish in other media. This most current version has been modified and extended beyond the original 3,000-word limit to convey a more comprehensive analysis.
I. Introduction
Peace has seemed a far-flung reality for the second largest island in the Philippine archipelago. To bring about unity, the Philippine government implemented approaches that ranged in scale from all-out war against insurgents to more palatable socio-economic agendas. But events suggest that previous attempts to empower and appease stakeholders resulted in cyclical periods of — short bursts of peace — dominated by elongated periods of armed conflict.
“Three centuries of intermittent warfare also sowed the seeds of animosity between Muslim and Christian peoples” (Conception, S., et. al., 2003). During the last four decades “there has been active conflict in Mindanao between the Philippine government, Moro Muslim groups, and other armed groups” (ACAPS, 2021). With a historical context dominated by violence, it comes as no surprise that cultural, religious and socio-economic differences are difficult to rebalance. As a result, human suffering still overshadows the natural beauty of the island and bloodshed continues to contrast against the lush, green landscape.
It is understandable why trust escapes the vernacular of the populace, and why peace eludes the grasp of public administrators, political actors, industry, and demoralized communities.
II. Observations
“Mindanao symbolizes resistance [,] …Moro people have resisted colonial conquest, assimilation by central government, and declarations of all-out war for over four centuries” (Concepcion, S., et. al., 2003). Fighting has become the habituated reflex to real or perceived religious, social or economic threats. Military intervention tipped the balance against insurgents; however, the tactical achievements resulted in a drawn-out resource-depleting toll on residents and critical infrastructure nodes. The government’s disruption of lawlessness resulted in collateral damage that muddled hopes, discomposed dreams and decelerated the economic momentum of already-marginalized regions in Mindanao.
By conducting a political orchestra where the sounds of bullets and explosions dominated the landscape, the sweeter sounds of socio-economic expansion were hardly heard. Government and armed factions desynchronized the ensemble to create a cacophony of noise, rather than the desired melody of peace and prosperity.
To add, disjointed socio-economic rebuilding programs delayed the restoration of order that alienated the most vulnerable segments of the population. The negative sentiments later became the fuel that re-kindled hostilities. Hopelessness in crisis-torn areas intensified as the complications of well-intentioned US programs such as Section 1206 (Department of Defense counterterrorism and stability operations program) and the now-expired Section 1207 (Secretary of Defense program that authorized transfer of funds to the Secretary of State for stability operations) delayed program implementation.
The frustrating overlaps and voids of inflexible policy language — detached functionaries from the pulse of the community. The lack of synchronicity made program implementation difficult. The researchers of a 2010 United States Government Accountability Office report on the 1206 and 1207 programs “noted that the lack of clear, measurable goals makes it difficult for program managers and staff to link their day-to-day efforts to achieving the agency’s intended mission” (GAO, 2010).
“Implementation is not the problem, adaptation is.” — (Gilad, B., 2004)
According to Ben Gilad, founder of the Academy of Competitive Intelligence,
“all the [,] maneuvering in the world will not save a company whose strategy does not fit reality” (Gilad, B., 2004).
The internal dissonance between departments and the external separation from ground truth added what Gilad would call “another class of risk: operational” (Gilad, B., 2004). Unmanaged operational risk increases the overall strategic liability.
III. Recommendations
A. Create Public Value Through an Exchange Program Model
Due to habituated distrust, some of the people in Mindanao do not assimilate with others from different groups. Although they live within close proximity of each other, many view their neighbors as outsiders whose values seem foreign or misaligned from their own.
“Despite the military itself being a traditional hard power tool, foreign military training programs are a way in which foreign servicemembers can be socialized to hold more favorable views of the U.S.” (Martinez Machain, C., 2020). In this context, fully integrated peacebuilding training that includes civilians, military and industry provides the opportunity for mingling where there was once minimal contact.
The intermixing will dull the sting of negative beliefs.
The intermingling will inspire communal trust.
To increase the long-term sustainability of peace initiatives, administrators could integrate the proven success of US military exchange programs into Mindanao peacebuilding that create a three-sided “strategic triangle [,] …whether the purpose is publicly valuable, whether it will be politically and legally supported, and whether it is administratively and operationally viable” (Moore, M., 1995).
In short, a strategic triangle made up of civilians, military, and industry will form the authorizing body that will bring about a material manifestation of public value.
The curriculum could allow military personnel to shadow civilian counterparts. At the same time, civilian and business stakeholders could work closely with regional security elements to gain an appreciation of government’s resource-intensive campaigns for peace.
B. Educate to Disconnect from A History of Misunderstandings and Mistakes
“The peoples of Mindanao symbolize resilience…Moro peoples, the lumads (indigenous peoples) and Christian settlers [,] …have managed to survive and to thrive — at times, together, and at other times, separately” (Concepcion, S., et. al., 2003). The diverse groups have demonstrated the ability to temporarily coalesce to achieve shared goals, but often diverge when ancestral, historical, and familial factors are brought into the discussion. and could enable negative behavior rather than empower.
As the pace of global competition to access natural resources quickens, peace-finding skills can guide local leaders, some of whom have never been exposed to the processes of the global economy, toward sophisticated solutions that are conducive to regional, national and strategic progress.
For instance, MPI programs helped train “six ancestral domains in Northern and Western Mindanao related to mining, indigenous peoples’ rights, and peacebuilding [,] …enable them to make informed decisions about the development of their ancestral domains” (Goddard, F., 2021).
Situation-based peacemaking training will raise levels of empathy, enhance consideration for others, and reduce apprehension. And when training is delivered in controlled environments, community leaders can work on problem-solving skills until practiced to perfection well before the occurrence of crisis events.
Local leaders who master the soft skills of open, honest, and frank communications will be less likely to use physical force.
The shift from reflexive action to thoughtful dialogue will therefore reduce incidences of armed conflict over time.
To change the outcomes of future generations, efforts to inculcate peace-seeking could begin with academic curriculum that teaches religious and cultural acceptance, and not mere tolerance.
Tolerance is a negatively charged word based on fear and a mindset of scarcity.
Acceptance, on the other hand, is a more refined state of awareness that seeks to understand, does not dredge up past mistakes to rationalize incessant blaming, nor demands perfection.
Achieving this higher level of awareness takes time and starts at the primary and secondary scholastic levels. To diminish the effects of learned hatred, educational programs could encourage an integrative thought process. “Students need guidance to develop critical thinking about social issues of religion” (Floresta, 2020). Educators could dissect current programs as “a school’s religious position and practices are critical factors to consider as these may influence future generations” (Floresta, 2020). Once identified, academic elements that are not aligned with peacekeeping goals may be discarded.
In the crisis-prone areas of Mindanao, integrative education programs that teach personal and communal accountability can become critical waypoints from which healing can begin today. Thereupon, the benchmarks offer a baseline from which to reach tomorrow’s dreams.
C. Use Soft Power at Strategic Levels and Observable Efforts at Street-Level Alliances
Enduring US programs such as the Foreign Assistance Act mandated benevolent goals to “give the highest priority to [,] …directly improve the lives of their poorest people and their capacity to participate in the development of their countries” (GAO, 1976). However, the program faced numerous challenges during the implementation phase. In one of its legacy reports, the GAO found it “difficult to say how much of the aid was directed towards the most needy people” (GAO, 1976).
It is understandable how Mindanao’s underdeveloped infrastructure in the 1970s, incomplete road networks, and scant availability of transportation platforms hindered the timely delivery of materiel to intended recipients. However, even with more robust infrastructure improvements since the 1970s, a 2008 USAID report cited that direct assistance efforts “have had little impact in changing the dominant patron-client patterns and electoral violence [,]…little evidence is found that citizens are being helped to organize to work together through government/civil society mechanisms on shared local interests, or to advocate for Mindanao’s policy and other needs as a whole region” (Lund, M., Ullman, J., 2008).
This would seem to indicate that local communities consider the soft power of foreign actors — both from overseas and from the national capital — as more rigid and temporary than the locally-rooted elastic power that interfuse familial ties, tribal loyalties, and community affiliations.
To add to the multi-generational distrust, “there is a perception that USAID programs are decided and organized on sectoral lines and thus tend to be dispersed too thinly, lacking integration between projects that could otherwise enhance the impact of individual project benefits” (Lund, M., Ullman, J., 2008).
To offset the strength of street-level alliances, “both effort and assertive behaviors can make new firms more cognitively central within networks” (Fund, et. al., 2008 as cited by Lashley, K., and Pollack, T., 2020). USAID and NGOs could enhance their presence by tailoring their approach to use “effort [,] …with functional influencers” (Lashley, K., and Pollack, T., 2020) such as managers, administrators, and organizational-level functionaries. Simultaneously, “assertiveness (i.e., putting oneself forward…by enhancing one’s public visibility at various ceremonial events) [,] …more influential with political influencers who faced more symbolic interorganizational pressures” (Lashley, K., and Pollack, T., 2020).
The combined use of effort and assertiveness will ensure that the benevolence of external organizations remains distinctively humanitarian and void of political influence.
A two-pronged approach could strengthen the bond between the giver and the receiver and will make Mindanao’s human terrain less uneven.
D. Use the Task Force Approach to Control the Non-Profit Space
Military organizations are proficient at teaming with other units as a way to increase effectiveness. For instance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff operate in complex environments where “the strategic environment is fluid, with continually changing alliances, partnerships, and threats that rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge” (JCS, 2018).
An environment that does not maintain allegiance to a fixed shape, such as that of Mindanao, exposes the Task Force Commander to “threats that are increasingly transregional, multidomain, and multi-functional in nature” (JCS, 2018). The most important elements of task forces include “unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution” (JCS, 2018).
The arrangement demands that only a limited number of vetted organizations are authorized to operate within the contested space.
From a program management perspective, Sylvia and Sylvia highlighted that “the task force would act as the sounding board for ideas and as a coordinating body to ensure that various components of the planned changed are carried out on schedule” (Sylvia, R. D., Sylvia, K. M., 2012).
In Porter’s Five Competitive Forces Model “the essence of strategy formulation is coping with competition” (Porter, M., 1979).
In the intense rivalry to deliver services in Mindanao, administrators could be more aware that “competition is not manifested only in other players [,] …is rooted in its underlying economics, and competitive forces exist that go well beyond the established combatants in a particular industry” (Porter, M., 1979).
From an economic perspective, “new entrants to an industry bring new capacity” (Porter, M., 1979); however, “numerous small enterprises, just by existing [,] …just by being present and in the way, other enterprises thus conflict with the efficiency…” (Jacobs, J., 1970, p. 101).
Unbridled benevolence in Mindanao can dilute distinctiveness and reduce recognizability from the offerings of other organizations.
Efforts to differentiate services infuse a level of inefficiency — and dissonance — to the implementation of benevolent strategies to the point where dissonance has become “the most neglected risk in business” (Gilad, B., 2004).
The Joint Chief of Staff’s task force approach could be integrated into Mindanao’s NGO operational space.
In the future, a Joint Combined Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Task Force Director will ensure unity of purpose and remove redundancies by refusing the entry of misaligned NGOs.
The resulting efficiency will decrease delays and improve response times in addressing the most pressing of Mindanao’s humanitarian needs.
E. Manage Transition Points and Enhance Local Branding
We often think of transitions in terms of major milestones, such as the results of elections, annual celebrations, victories, birthdays, loss of family members, or graduation ceremonies. Major transitions create stress, excitement, worry, confusion, sadness or a heightened state of anticipation.
Unmanaged micro-transitions are similarly destructive. Smaller and less noticeable transitions occur daily which, if left unaddressed, inflict a high level of tension on team members. These micro-transitions can be induced by the absence of a team member, or when duties and responsibilities are re-organized, or when a member is added to the team. Within this granular framework, subtle changes that are not carefully managed can result in perpetual interpersonal misunderstanding that can sour team relationships.
Being mindful of Tuckman’s stages of group development model, managers can quell tension at each stage of “Forming, Storming, Norming, Performing, and Adjourning” West Chester University, n. d.). At every phase, administrators could ensure that they immediately address negative sentiments that have the potential to dilute group loyalty.
All communities develop a culture code which is “the unconscious meaning we apply to any given thing –a car, a type of food a relationship, even a country — via the culture in which we are raised” (Rapaille, C., 2007). The codes are absorbed through exposure and habit. “Widely known as an imprint [,] …strongly conditions our thought processes and shapes our future actions.” (Rapaille, C., 2007).
Stakeholders in war-torn regions could integrate Rapaille’s methodologies to reshape, at a visceral level, the meaning of key words such as peace, hope, and wealth.
The primal brain responses will help create meaningful narratives that resonate with all the variations of value systems among Mindanao’s stakeholders.
Peace is an element of a community’s brand image. Branding, according to Patrick Hanlon, consists of seven elements.
Building and sustaining a brand takes daily effort. Patrick Hanlon’s “Primal Branding” points out that a community’s “search for meaning revealed [,] …movements, ideologies, and civic communities unwittingly, instinctively, and through time bring together seven definable assets that construct meaning behind the brand” (Hanlon, P., 2006). If the rebranding of Mindanao as a peaceful island lacks one of the seven elements of branding, initiatives could lose traction, momentum, and overall support.
Mindanao’s war-torn communities are forced to reconfigure roles, reassess priorities and rebrand after crisis events. Frequent occurrence of traumatic events can diminish individual confidence, and may later lead to a loss of communal morale.
As communities re-draw alliances and become more integrated, or when alliances temporarily fall apart, Hanlon’s seven elements of branding could become a key factor that will ground stakeholders to peacebuilding ideals.
Industry proven non-invasive approaches to team building could strengthen local communities so that law-abiding citizens may be more able resist the incursions of lawless elements.
F. Create a Robust Export Cluster Economy in Crisis Areas
In “The Economy of Cities”, Jane Jacobs stated that “one of the great advantages of a company town [,] …is that there are few alternative ways for people to earn their livings. But this does not promote economic growth.” (Jacobs, J., 1970). Economic growth and vibrancy, according to Jacobs, are achieved and sustained when many industries and enterprises of all sizes complement and compete within a particular ecosystem..
“Export diversification is associated with economic development and macroeconomic activity” (Bahar, D., et. al., 2017). Regions that depend on a single industry often fail when competition increases or when resources are depleted.
Within the crisis-prone areas of Mindanao, economic opportunities are limited, and revenue depends largely on agriculture.
The following example illustrates the issues when an already-impoverished area is dependent on agriculture and has a non-technical, commoditized labor force that can be quickly replaced. The town of “Datu Paglas in the war-torn province of Maguindanao in the ARMM [,] …has been pictured as a ‘miracle town’…as “the first cavendish banana-for-export plantation in the Muslim region” (Concepcion, S., 2003). However, the “labour contracting [,] … has resulted in the reduction of plantation workers’ benefits [,] …a number of cases of farmworkers quitting due to low wages and delayed payment.” (Concepcion, S., 2003).
What was intended to be a source of a living wage, instead strained tribal relations and created mistrust between disadvantaged laborer and industry.
In modern economies, jobs in the export or “traded industry clusters are groups of interlinked businesses that sell goods and services in markets outside the region [,] …have excellent potential to drive inclusive growth [,] …examples [,] …include metals and machinery manufacturing, biomedical products, freight and logistics, and business services” (CMAP, n. d.).
Traded cluster careers demand more training and certification, but also deliver higher salaries for employees.
In Chicago, “they account for more than half of the region’s wages, but only-one third of its jobs [,] …industry cluster jobs pay $15,200 more per year than industries serving only local customers” (CMAP, n. d.).
It has been said that the best type of charity is to give someone a job; however, the type of job also matters.
It sounds far-fetched, but adding a technologically-oriented sector in marginalized areas could become the infusion that ends warfare. Higher wages will have an immediate positive financial impact on employees, families, and communities. According the Bahar, “one standard deviation of higher technology linkages makes the emergence of a new product up to three times more likely, and is associated with a subsequent annual export growth” (Bahar, D., et. al, 2017).
One export cluster job creates three local cluster positions.
Highly technical export cluster jobs could diversify the sources of revenue beyond the agrarian model.
The resulting increase in economic momentum will reduce the number of Mindanao’s crisis events.
Implementing this shift will take a few years and require external support during the initial stages; however, the future increase in revenue from the export cluster component will kickstart the brisk and dynamic ecosystem that Jane Jacobs talked about in the 1970s.
Mindanao’s future economic vibrancy will entice more foreign investment, reduce Mindanao’s dependence on government programs, and align the island as a key technological partner in the global economy.
IV. Conclusion
Creative peacemaking in Mindanao requires a courageous leap from the constraints of regulations and policies. Official prescriptions set limits to organizational actions, and hardly discuss the effectiveness of outside-the-box creative thinking as a public value. When an initiative fails, pages of additional government regulations are added in the same un-spirited fashion that confuse and delay, rather than deconflict and expedite.
To finally achieve peace, administrators could follow the responsiveness of multi-billion dollar corporations that immediately address points of contention to keep consumers endeared to products, services, and ideas.
There is no reason why peace and prosperity cannot be inculcated into the thought processes of Mindanaoans. When stakeholders begin to view their communities as brands, administrators will be less concerned with losing the populace to lawlessness.
It is time to create public value that blends the surefootedness of government and the creativity of industry to rebrand Mindanao as a center for economic vitality and peaceful alliances.
Copyright Leonard Casiple 2021. All rights reserved.
To learn more, visit Public Value LLC.
To learn more about the author, visit Leo’s LinkedIn.
Works Cited
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